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1 Introduction
The existence of local indeterminacy and sunspot fluctuations under gross
substitutability are well established facts whithin OLG economies. Consid-
ering an aggregate model with endogenous labor and consumption in the
second period of life only, Reichlin [9] has shown that Hopf cycles and thus
local indeterminacy arise with a unique Pareto optimal steady state when
the technology is Leontief. This conclusion has had a strong echo in the lit-
erature as it implies that the introduction of a public policy based on taxes
and transfers could at the same time stabilize the economy and reach the
Pareto optimal steady state along which all generations get an equal level
of utility.
However, Cazzavillan and Pintus [3] have recently proved that the co-
existence of local indeterminacy and dynamic efficiency is not robust to the
consideration of any positive elasticity of capital-labor substitution. Indeed,
apart from the very special case of Leontief technology, the steady state is
always characterized by an over-accumulation of capital when local indeter-
minacy holds,1 and policies targeting the steady state allocation generically
leave room for welfare losses associated with productive inefficiency.
As initially shown in Galor [6], local indeterminacy also arises in two-
sector OLG economies under gross substitutability. However, the Pareto
optimality of the equilibrium has not been precisely discussed in such a
framework. On the one hand, Reichlin [10] proves local indeterminacy of a
dynamically inefficient steady state through the existence of periodic, quasi-
periodic and chaotic dynamics under the assumption of Leontief technolo-
gies. On the other hand, Drugeon et al. [5] show that any dynamically
efficient equilibrium path is locally determinate if the sectoral elasticities of
capital-labor substitution are large enough.
Our main objective in this paper is to show that Reichlin’s [9] result is
a robust property in a two-sector OLG economy. Assuming gross substi-
tutability and a capital intensive consumption good sector, we prove indeed
that local indeterminacy can occur under dynamic efficiency when interme-
diary values for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
and low enough but positive sectoral elasticities of capital-labor substitution
are considered. This conclusion shows that contrary to the aggregate frame-
work, in two-sector OLG economies with capital-labor substitutability, some
fiscal policy rules can eliminate business-cycle fluctuations in the economy
1See also Cazzavillan and Pintus [2] for an extension of this result to a model with
positive first-period consumption.
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by driving it to an optimal steady state as soon as it is announced.
2 The model
2.1 Production
The economy consists in one consumption good y0 and one capital good y
produced from capital and labor through standard constant returns to scale
technologies:
y0 = f0(k0, l0), y = f1(k1, l1) with k0 + k1 ≤ k and l0 + l1 ≤ ` (1)
k being the total stock of capital and ` the total amount of labor.
Assumption 1. Each production function f i : R2+ → R+, i = 0, 1, is C2,
increasing in each argument, concave, homogeneous of degree one and such
that for any x > 0, f i1(0, x) = f
i
2(x, 0) = +∞, f i1(+∞, x) = f i2(x,+∞) = 0.
As y ≤ f1(k, `), Assumption 1 implies that there exists k¯(`) > 0 solution of
k − f1(k, `) = 0 such that f1(k, `) > k when k < k¯(`), while f1(k, `) < k
when k > k¯(`). The set of admissible 3-uples (k, y, `) is thus defined as
K˜ = {(k, y, `) ∈ R3+|0 < `, 0 ≤ k ≤ k¯(`), 0 ≤ y ≤ f1(k, `)} (2)
For any (k, y, `), profit maximization in the representative firm of each
sector is equivalent to solving the following problem of optimal allocation of
productive factors between the two sectors:
T (k, y, `) = max
k0,k1,l0,l1
f0(k0, l0)
s.t. y ≤ f1(k1, l1)
k0 + k1 ≤ k
l0 + l1 ≤ `
k0, k1, l0, l1 ≥ 0
(3)
The social production function T (k, y, `) gives the maximal output of the
consumption good along interior temporary equilibria (k, y, `) ∈ K˜. Under
Assumption 1, T (k, y, `) is homogeneous of degree one, concave and C2 over
K˜.2 Denoting w the wage rate, r the gross rental rate of capital and p the
price of investment good, all in terms of the price of the consumption good,
we derive from the envelope theorem that
2See Benhabib and Nishimura [1].
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r = T1(k, y, `), p = −T2(k, y, `), w = T3(k, y, `) (4)
The share of capital in total income is then given by
s(k, y, `) = rkT (k,y,`)+py ∈ (0, 1) (5)
2.2 Consumption and savings
In each period t, Nt agents are born, and they live for two periods. In their
first period of life (when young), the agents are endowed with one unit of
labor that they supply inelastically to firms. Their income results from the
real wage and is allocated between current consumption and savings which
are invested in the firms. In their second period of life (when old), they are
retired and their income resulting from the return on the savings is entirely
consumed. The utility function of a representative agent, defined over his
consumption bundle (ct, when he is young, and dt+1, when he is old), is
u(ct, dt+1) =
[
c
1−1/γ
t + δ(dt+1/B)
1−1/γ
]γ/(γ−1)
with δ ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor, γ > 0 the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption and B > 0 a scaling parameter.
Each agent is assumed to have 1 + n > 0 children so that Nt+1 =
(1 + n)Nt. Under perfect foresight, and considering the wage rate wt and
the gross rate of return Rt+1 as given, a young agent maximizes his utility
function over his life-cycle as follows:
max
ct,dt+1,φt
u(ct, dt+1)
s.t. wt = ct + φt
Rt+1φt = dt+1
ct, dt+1, φt ≥ 0
(6)
Solving the first order conditions gives:
ct = wt1+δγ(Rt+1/B)γ−1 ≡ α(Rt+1/B)wt (7)
with α(R/B) ∈ (0, 1) the share of first period consumption over the wage
income. Under gross substitutability, γ > 1 and the saving function φt =
(1− α(Rt+1/B))wt is increasing in R.
2.3 Perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium
Total labor is given by the number Nt of young households, i.e., `t = Nt,
and is increasing at rate n, i.e., `t+1 = (1 + n)`t. We also assume complete
depreciation of capital within one period.
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Definition 1. A sequence {kt, yt, `t, ct, dt, rt, wt, pt}∞t=0, with (k0, `0) =
(kˆ0, ˆ`0) given, is a perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium if:
i) ct = α(Rt+1/B)wt;
ii) `t(1− α(Rt+1/B))wt = ptyt;
iii) yt = kt+1;
iv) `t+1 = (1 + n)`t;
v) `t[ct + dt/(1 + n)] = T (kt, yt, `t);
vi) (rt, wt, pt) is given by (4);
vii) Rt+1 = rt+1/pt.
Let κ = k/` and κ¯ be the solution of κ− f1(κ, 1) = 0. The set of admissible
paths given by (2) can be redefined as follows
K = {(κt, κt+1) ∈ R2+|0 ≤ κt ≤ κ¯, 0 ≤ κt+1 ≤ f1(κt, 1)/(1 + n)} (8)
A perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium then satisfies
(1 + n)κt+1 +
T3(κt,(1+n)κt+1,1)
T2(κt,(1+n)κt+1,1)
[
1− α
(
−T1(κt+1,(1+n)κt+2,1)T2(κt,(1+n)κt+1,1)B
)]
= 0 (9)
with α(R/B) given by (7), (κt, κt+1) ∈ K and κ0 = κˆ0 = kˆ0/ˆ`0 given.
3 Steady state and dynamic efficiency
3.1 A normalized steady state
A steady state is defined as κt = κ∗ for all t with κ∗ solution of
α
(
− T1(κ,(1+n)κ,1)T2(κ,(1+n)κ,1)B
)
= 1 + (1 + n)κT2(κ,(1+n)κ,1)T3(κ,(1+n)κ,1) ≡ Φκ ∈ (0, 1) (10)
We consider a family of economies parameterized by γ 6= 1. We follow the
same procedure as in Drugeon et al. [5]: we use the scaling parameter B to
ensure the existence of a normalized steady state (NSS) κ∗ ∈ (0, κ¯) which
remains invariant as γ is varied. From (7) and (10) we get:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, let γ 6= 1 and κ∗ ∈ (0, κ¯). Then
there exists a unique value B(κ∗) > 0 as given by
B(κ∗) = −T1(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)T2(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)
( −(1+n)κ∗T2(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)
δγ [T3(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)+(1+n)κ∗T2(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)]
) 1
1−γ
such that κ∗ is a steady state if and only if B = B(κ∗).
Proof : See Appendix 5.1.
In the rest of the paper we assume thatB = B(κ∗) so that s = s(κ∗, κ∗, 1)
and α = α(R∗/B(κ∗)) = Φκ∗ remain constant as γ is made to vary.
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3.2 Dynamic efficiency
From Definition 1 and the homogeneity of T (k, y, `), considering that
κ∗T2/T3 = (T2/T1)(κ∗T1/T3) = −s/R∗(1 − s), we derive the stationary
gross rate of return along the NSS:
R∗ = (1+n)s(1−α)(1−s) (11)
Under-accumulation of capital is obtained if and only if R∗ > 1 + n. As
shown in Drugeon et al. [5] we have:
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, let γ 6= 1 and α = 1 − s/(1 − s).
Then:
i) the NSS is characterized by an under-accumulation of capital if and
only if α ≥ α;
ii) an intertemporal competitive equilibrium converging towards the NSS
is dynamically efficient if α ∈ (α, 1) and dynamically inefficient if α ∈ (0, α).
If the labor income is relatively larger than the capital income (s < 1/2), α >
0 and young agents receive enough wage resources to provide a large amount
of savings. But over-accumulation of capital can be avoided provided the
share of first period consumption over the wage income is large enough, i.e.
the agent does not save too much.
4 Local indeterminacy under dynamic efficiency
Let us introduce the relative capital intensity difference across sectors
b ≡ (k1/l1 − k0/l0) l1/y (12)
and the elasticity of the rental rate of capital
εrk = −T11(κ∗, (1 + n)κ∗, 1)κ∗/T1(κ∗, (1 + n)κ∗, 1) (13)
evaluated at the NSS. From now on we consider a positive value for α = 1−
s/(1− s), we assume gross substitutability, a capital intensive consumption
good,3 and we consider dynamically efficient paths:
Assumption 2. s ∈ (0, 1/2), γ > 1, b < 0 and α ≥ α.
We then prove that contrary to the aggregate OLG model, local indeter-
minacy arises under dynamic efficiency in a two-sector model with positive
capital-labor substitution.
3When γ > 1, this is a necessary condition for local indeterminacy (See Galor [6]).
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Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1-2, let b¯ = −1/(1 + n) and b = −(1 −
α)/(1 + n)α. Then there exist εrk > 0, γ > 1 and γ¯ > γ such that the NSS
is locally indeterminate if and only if s ∈ (1/3, 1/2), α ∈ (α, 1/2), b ∈ (b, b¯),
εrk > εrk and γ ∈ (γ, γ¯).
Proof : See Appendix 5.2.
Theorem 1 is based on a large elasticity εrk. This restriction can be
interpreted through the aggregate elasticity of capital-labor substitution Σ
which is linked to εrk as follows (see Drugeon [4]):
Σ = y0+pypyky0
(
pyk0l0σ0 + y0k1l1σ1
)
, εrk =
(
l0/y0
)2 w(y0+py)
Σ
(14)
with σ0 and σ1 the sectoral elasticities of input substitution. Local inde-
terminacy under dynamic efficiency then requires a low enough aggregate
elasticity Σ, i.e. low enough but still positive sectoral elasticities. Note also
that the consumption good sector has to be sufficiently capital intensive. If
b is too close to 0, i.e. if the model is close to the aggregate formulation, we
get the same conclusion as Cazzavillan and Pintus [2, 3]: local indetermi-
nacy under dynamic efficiency can never arise with any positive elasticity of
capital-labor substitution.
Remark 1: Note that γ¯ is generically a flip bifurcation value giving rise to
period-two cycles which are locally indeterminate (or unstable) in a right (or
left) neighborhood of γ¯, while γ is generically a transcritical bifurcation value
leading to the existence of a second steady state which is locally unstable
(saddle-point stable) in a right (left) neighborhood of γ (see Figure 1 in
Appendix 5.2).
Through the NSS, the conditions on α, s, b and εrk in Theorem 1 are
based on joint restrictions of the technologies. We need therefore to show
that they can be satisfied with standard production functions. Consider the
following CES formulations:
f0(k0, l0) =
[
χ(k0)−ς + (1− χ)(l0)−ς]− 1ς
f1(k1, l1) =
[
1
2
(
k1
η
)−ρ
+ (l
1)
2
−ρ]− 1ρ (15)
with χ ∈ (0, 1), ς, ρ > −1 and η > 0. The sectoral elasticities of capital-labor
substitution are given by σ0 = 1/(1 + ς) and σ1 = 1/(1 + ρ). We assume
for simplicity a constant population, i.e. n = 0. Note that when σ1 = 0
the investment good technology becomes Leontief as limρ→+∞ f1(k1, l1) =
6
min{k1/η, l1}. Assume in a first step that σ1 = 0. As y = k1/η = l1, we get
T 0(k, y, `) =
[
χ(k − ηy)−ς + (1− χ)(`− y)−ς]−1/ς
Following Proposition 1, we consider a NSS κ = κ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and we compute
α0 = (1−χ)(1−η)
1+ςκ∗ς(1−κ∗)−ηχ(1−κ∗)1+ς
(1−χ)(1−η)1+ςκ∗ς , s
0 = χ(1−κ
∗)1+ς
(1−χ)(1−η)1+ςκ∗ς
α0 = (1−χ)(1−η)
1+ςκ∗ς−χ(1−κ∗)1+ς
(1−χ)(1−η)1+ςκ∗ς , b
0 = η−κ
∗
1−κ∗ and ε
0
rk =
(1+ς)(1−χ)κ∗ς
(1−η)
h
χ
“
1−κ∗
κ∗(1−η)
”ς
+1−χ
i
together with the bounds b¯ = −1,
b0 = − (1−χ)(1−η)1+ςκ∗1+ς+ηχ(1−κ∗)1+ς
(1−χ)(1−η)1+ςκ∗ς(1−κ∗)−ηχ(1−κ∗)1+ς ,
ε0rk =
(κ∗−η)(1−κ∗)(1−χ)
(2κ∗−1−η)(1−η)ηχ
χ(1+η)+(1−χ)
“
κ∗(1−η)
1−κ∗
”1+ς
χ
“
1−κ∗
κ∗(1−η)
”ς
+1−χ
In a first step we derive that if κ∗ ∈ (1/2, 1), χ ∈ (χ0
1
, χ¯0) with
χ0
1
= (1−η)
ςκ∗1+ς
(1−κ∗)1+ς+(1−η)ςκ∗1+ς , χ¯
0 = (1−η)
1+ςκ∗ς
(1−κ∗)1+ς+(1−η)1+ςκ∗ς
and η < η¯0 = min{1− κ∗, 2κ∗ − 1}, then s0 ∈ (1/3, 1/2), α0 ∈ (α0, 1/2) and
b0 ∈ (b0,−1). In a second step, we derive that if ς > ς0 with
ς0 =
κ∗[1−η(1−η)−κ∗2]
(2κ∗−1−η)η
then there exists χ0
2
∈ (0, χ¯) given by
χ0
2
=
(κ∗−η)(1−κ∗)
“
κ∗(1−η)
1−κ∗
”1+ς
ς(2κ∗−1−η)η−κ∗[1+η2−κ∗(1+η)]+(κ∗−η)(1−κ∗)
“
κ∗(1−η)
1−κ∗
”1+ς
such that εrk > ε0rk when χ > χ
0
2
. Denoting χ0 = max{χ0
1
, χ0
2
}, we have
then proved:
Lemma 1. Let the production functions be given by (15) with σ1 = 0. If
κ∗ ∈ (1/2, 1), η < η¯0, ς > ς0 and χ ∈ (χ0, χ¯0), there exist γ0 > 1 and
γ¯0 > γ0 such that the NSS is locally indeterminate for any γ ∈ (γ0, γ¯0).
Assume now that σ1 > 0. The social production function derived as the
value function of program (3) is parameterized by σ1, namely T σ1(k, y, `).
Considering the same NSS κ = κ∗ ∈ (0, 1), we can similarly compute ασ1 ,
sσ1 , ασ1 , bσ1 , εσ1rk , b
σ1 and εσ1rk . We have the following property:
Lemma 2. The social production function T σ1(k, y, `) is continuous in
(k, y, `, σ1), and as σ1 → 0, converges to T 0(k, y, `) uniformly in (k, y, `),
i.e. for any  > 0, there is ξ > 0 such that if 0 < σ1 < ξ, |T σ1(k, y, `) −
T 0(k, y, `)| <  for any (k, y, `) ∈ K˜.
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Proof : See Appendix 5.3.
It follows from these Lemmas that limσ1→0(ασ1 , sσ1 , ασ1 , bσ1 , ε
σ1
rk , b
σ1 , εσ1rk) =
(α0, s0, α0, b0, ε0rk, b
0, ε0rk). We have then proved:
Proposition 3. Let the production functions be given by (15). If κ∗ ∈
(1/2, 1), there is σ¯1 > 0 such that for all σ1 ∈ [0, σ¯1) there exist η¯σ1 ∈ (0, 1),
ςσ1 > 0, χσ1 ∈ (0, 1), χ¯σ1 ∈ (0, 1), γσ1 > 1 and γ¯σ1 > γσ1 such that when
η < η¯σ1, ς > ςσ1 and χ ∈ (χσ1 , χ¯σ1), the NSS is locally indeterminate for
any γ ∈ (γσ1 , γ¯σ1).
Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 show that in a two-sector OLG economy, the
existence of local indeterminacy under dynamic efficiency is compatible with
positive capital-labor substitution in each sector. Following Reichlin [9], our
conclusion suggests that the Pareto optimal steady state can be considered
as a target of the policymaker. Indeed the introduction of a public policy
based on taxes and transfers could at the same time rule out business-cycle
fluctuations in the economy and drive the equilibrium to the optimal steady
state which provides an equal level of utility to all generations.
Let us prove now along the line of Reichlin [9] that such a policy ex-
ists under the assumption that agents and public authority do not make
forecasting mistakes. Assume that the public authority buys goods, levies
taxes and makes transfers. Let gt be the flow of consumption goods which
is bought, τyt < (>)0 the taxes (transfers) on the income of the young and
τ ot < (>)0 the taxes (transfers) on the income of the old. We assume a bal-
anced budget rule, i.e. gt + τ
y
t + τ
o
t = 0. The agent’s first and second period
budget constraints become wt+τ
y
t = ct+φt and Rt+1φt+τ
o
t+1 = dt+1. From
utility maximization, we get the optimal saving
φt =
B(δRt+1/B)γ(wt+τ
y
t )−τot+1
Rt+1+B(δRt+1/B)γ
(16)
and a perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium satisfies
(1 + n)κt+1pt =
B(δRt+1/B)γ(wt+τ
y
t )−τot+1
Rt+1+B(δRt+1/B)γ
(17)
Now consider the expression of the normalization constant as given in Propo-
sition 1 evaluated at some point κ ∈ (0, κ¯), namely B = B(κ) such that:
B(κ) = r(κ)p(κ)
(
(1+n)κp(κ)
δγ [w(κ)−(1+n)κp(κ)]
) 1
1−γ
with r(κ) = T1(κ, (1 + n)κ, 1), p(κ) = −T2(κ, (1 + n)κ, 1) and w(κ) =
T3(κ, (1 + n)κ, 1). Let
8
τˆ ot+1 = (1 + n)
{
κp(κ) [R(κ) +B(κ)(δR(κ)/B(κ))γ ]
(
Rt+1
R(κ)
)γ
− κt+1pt [Rt+1 +B(κ)(δRt+1/B(κ))γ ]
}
τˆyt = w(κ)− wt
(18)
with R(κ) = r(κ)/p(κ). Plugging τyt = τˆ
y
t , τ
o
t+1 = τˆ
o
t+1 and τ
y
t+1 = τ
o
t+2 = 0
into (17) gives
(1 + n)κp(κ) = (δR(κ)/B(κ))
γB(κ)w(κ)
R(κ)+(δR(κ)/B(κ))γ (19)
As shown in Proposition 1, there exists a solution κ = κ∗ which corresponds
to the normalized stationary Pareto optimal perfect-foresight competitive
equilibrium. It follows that if agents believe in this announced policy rule,
they will expect the optimal NSS allocation to hold in the future. This
expectation in turn drives the sytem to the NSS and keep it there forever.
Note however that contrary to Riechlin [9], when local indeterminacy holds,
the NSS is not the unique stationary solution of equation (19). Indeed, as
mentioned in Remark 1, a second steady state generically exists through
a transcritical bifuration occurring at γ and is locally unstable for γ > γ.
It follows that the stabilization policy (18) has to be parameterized by the
right NSS in order to jump on the optimal stationary allocation.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the set K as defined by (8) and the expression of α(R/B) as given
by (7). κ∗ ∈ (0, κ¯) is a solution of (10) if
1
1+δγ
“
− T1(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)
T2(κ
∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)B
”γ−1 = 1 + (1 + n)κ∗T2(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)T3(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1) ∈ (0, 1) (20)
Then there exists a unique positive value of B solution of (20) given by
B(κ∗) = −T1(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)T2(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)
( −(1+n)κ∗T2(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)
[T3(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)+(1+n)κ∗T2(κ∗,(1+n)κ∗,1)]δγ
) 1
1−γ
and κ∗ is a steady state if and only if B = B(κ∗).
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1
From (7), we get
α′(R/B) = (1− γ)α(R/B)(1− α(R/B))B/R (21)
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Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we get from the first order conditions of pro-
gram (3)
T12 = −T11b < 0, T22 = T11b2 < 0, T31 = −T11a > 0, T32 = T11ab > 0 (22)
with a ≡ k0/l0 > 0, b as defined by (12) and T11 < 0. Considering (13)
together with (22), T1κ∗/T3 = s/(1 − s), −T1/T2 = R∗ = s/(1 − α)(1 − s)
and the fact that homogeneity of T (k, y, `) implies a = [1− (1+n)b]κ∗, total
differenciation of (9) using (4), (5) and (21) evaluated at the NSS gives the
characteristic polynomial P(λ) = λ2 − λT (γ) +D(γ) with
D(γ) = s[(1+n)bα(γ−1)+1−α+α(1+n)b](1+n)b(1−α)(1−s)α(γ−1) , T (γ) = 1(1+n)bεrkα(γ−1) +
1+D(1+n)2b2
(1+n)b
When B = B(κ∗), the NSS, α, s and εrk remain constant for any γ 6= 1. We
then study the variations of T (γ) and D(γ) in the (T ,D) plane as γ varies
within (1,+∞). Solving T (γ) and D(γ) with respect to α(γ − 1) yields to
D = ∆(T ) = εrks[1−α+α(1+n)b]T(1−α)(1−s)+εrks(1+n)b[1−α+α(1+n)b]
− εrks[1−α+α(1+n)b]−s(1+n)b(1+n)b[(1−α)(1−s)+εrks(1+n)b(1−α+α(1+n)b)]
and allows to use the methodology introduced by Grandmont et al. [7]. As
γ spans the interval (1,+∞), T (γ) and D(γ) vary linearly along the line
∆(T ). The fundamental properties of ∆(T ) depend on its extremities. The
starting point of the pair (T (γ),D(γ)) is obtained when γ = +∞:
D(+∞) = D∞ = s(1−α)(1−s) , T (+∞) = T∞ = (1−α)(1−s)+(1+n)
2b2s
(1+n)b(1−α)(1−s) (23)
while the end point is obtained when γ converges to 1 from above. Let
b¯ = −1/(1 + n), b = −(1 − α)/(1 + n)α and bˆ = −(1 − α)(1 − s)/(1 + n)s.
As limγ→1+ D(γ) = limγ→1+ T (γ) = ∞, ∆(T ) is a half-line starting from
(T∞,D∞) and pointing downwards or upwards depending on the sign of
D′(γ) = s(b−b)
b(1−α)(1−s)(γ−1)2 (24)
Under Assumptions 1-2, we get from (23) that D∞ = R∗/(1 +n) > 1. Local
indeterminacy then requires that D′(γ) > 0, i.e. b ∈ (b1, 0) as shown by
(24). But in this case, D = 1 implies T < −2. Indeed, solving D = 1 gives
α(1− γ) = αs(b−b)b(1−s)(α−α) (25)
which can be satisfied if and only if b ∈ (b, 0). Moreover, substituting D = 1
into the expression of T allows to get
T + 2 = 1(1+n)bεrkα(γ−1) +
[1+(1+n)b]2
(1+n)b < 0 (26)
Therefore, when b ∈ (b, 0), the only possibility to get local indeterminacy is
that the ∆-half-line crosses the interior of segment [AC] as follows
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Figure 1: Local indeterminacy with dynamic efficiency.
This requires that 1+T∞+D∞ = (b¯−b)(b−bˆ)/bbˆ < 0 ⇔ b ∈ (−∞, b¯)∪(bˆ, 0),
and that D = −1 implies T > 0. Solving D = −1 gives
α(1− γ) = αs(b−b)b[1−α(1−s)] (27)
which holds if and only if b ∈ (b, 0). Substituting D = −1 into T gives
T = εrkαs(b−b)(1+n)2(b¯2−b2)−b[1−α(1−s)](1+n)bεrkαs(b−b) (28)
Noting that b < b¯ ⇔ α < 1/2 and α < 1/2 ⇔ s > 1/3, we derive
from (28) that ∆(T ) = −1 implies T > 0 if and only if s ∈ (1/3, 1/2),
α ∈ (α, 1/2), b ∈ (b, b¯) and εrk > εrk with
εrk =
b[1−α(1−s)]
(1+n)2(b20−b2)αs(b−b1)
> 0 (29)
The result follows.
5.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We use the same kind of argument as Nishimura and Yano ([8], Lemma 1, p.
229). Define the set E(k, y, `, σ1) = {(k0, l0) ≥ 0|y ≤ f1(k−k0, `−l0)}. Then
T σ1(k, y, `) = max f0(k0, l0) s.t. (k0, l0) ∈ E(k, y, `, σ1). Since E(k, y, `, σ1)
is lower-semi-continuous in (k, y, `, σ1), T σ1(k, y, `) is continuous. It fol-
lows also that the functions (k0σ1(k, y, `), l
0
σ1(k, y, `)) = argmaxf
0(k0, l0) s.t.
(k0, l0) ∈ E(k, y, `, σ1) are continuous. Moreover, as limρ→+∞ f1(k1, l1) =
min{k1/η, l1}, we can find a sub-sequence σ1i such that when σ1i → 0,
(k0σ1(k, y, `), l
0
σ1(k, y, `)) → (k − ηy, ` − y) for any (k, y, `) ∈ K˜. Therefore,
the uniform convergence follows and limσ1→0 T σ1(k, y, `) = T 0(k, y, `).
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